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Abstract 
The increasing reliance on computer networks and the internet by organizations have no doubt exposed their 
information to attacks from both outsiders and from the organization insiders. Different countermeasures are 
currently being adopted to secure information from attacks. These countermeasures are often deployed in 
isolation and they are all essentially designed to checking outsider threats or attacks. In this paper, an integrated 
approach to deploying these counter measures is proposed, and the possibility of deploying these counter 
measures to check insider attacks is presented.  An objected oriented design methodology was used to design the 
platform upon which this integration was based. Data modification and impersonation attack scenarios were 
simulated and forensically analyzed to test the functionalities desired. The results showed that the integrated use 
of the detectors enhanced information protection and at the same time it provided for forensic evidence for 
establishing the culpability of the exact offender.  
Keywords:  Forensic Analysis; Trio model; Network Intrusion Detection; Insider Threats; Network Security; 
Honeypot; Horney-Token; Wireshark. 
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1 Introduction 
As a result of the provisioning of services on networks and internet, vita information is exposed to attacks from 
both the outsiders and insider users of the network. These attacks can be in the form of disclosure, destruction, 
modification of data or denial of access to data.  
Consequently, different security counter measures must be put in place by organizations to deal with these 
attacks intended against their information. The commonly used counter measures include firewall, antivirus 
software, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS).  
However, these intrusion detection approaches are often deployed in isolation and have often targeted the 
attacks at the system level and neglected attacks on user application where most malicious activities normally 
occur. Also, it is a challenge for these counter measures to have knowledge of the user responsibilities in a 
network because they work in isolation from access control for the applications they are designed to protect. 
This lack of coordination and interoperation among these components constitutes a major setback in detecting 
and responding appropriately to the rising incidence of network attacks and network insider abuses.  
To effectively address the problem of intentional malicious adversaries, [1] posit that systems must leverage 
multiple complementary and mutually supportive techniques to detect and deter them. What this statement 
advises is that organization needs to do everything possible to ensure that their information resources are 
adequately protected using more than one technique. 
Designing and implementing appropriate network security measures must be based on identification of potential 
threats to the network and the related vulnerabilities. And the design objectives must seek to minimize the risks 
of any potential threats.  
What obtains currently is that most attention is focused on threats from the outside while those of the insiders 
are overlooked. While organizations are likely to experience more outsider attacks than insider attacks the 
effects of the insider attacks may be more grievous and more difficult to detect [2]. Consequently, organizations 
need to have the appropriate tools to identify and detect early signs of insider threats with the view to 
implementing strategies to detect and prevent such attacks. This is the thrust of this paper, and the motivation is 
the need for a platform that will support the interoperability of intrusion detection approaches with access 
control and authentication mechanisms. 
2 Related Literatures 
In order to check the occurrences of intrusions, many organizations have adopted different strategies. The three 
most popular security technologies implemented by organizations to reduce their exposure to security threats are 
listed in [3]. These are firewalls, antivirus software, and intrusion detection systems. The most basic technology 
used is the firewall. A firewall is a mechanism for maintaining control over the traffic that flows into and out of 
a network [4]. This mechanism can be a machine or software that stands between a local network and the 
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internet to filter out traffic that might be harmful. The whole essence of using a firewall is to limit access 
between networks and this is usually done in accordance with organization’s security policies. 
The biggest disadvantage of firewall, according to [5] is that it gives no protection against insider attacks. 
Insiders do not need to pass through firewall to access the network as they are already within the network 
perimeter. And it is these insiders that actually pose a higher risk to security of organization’s information 
resources. The report of [6] showed a marked increase in the incidence of insider’s threats to organizations 
information resource between the periods 2010 and 2011. Incidentally, insider intrusion detection remains an 
active area of research. 
The first compelling reason listed in [7] for acquiring and using IDS was the detection of attacks and other 
security violations that were not prevented by other security measures. The second was to prevent problem 
behavior by increasing the perceived risk of discovery and punishment for those who would attack or otherwise 
abuse the system. 
Ordinarily, IDS do not provide protection on the networks because intrusions are often detected after they have 
occurred.  Secondly, IDS have limitations in detecting insider misuse of resources because they do not have 
knowledge of user responsibilities and the separation of duties that should be enforced. This is because present 
IDS work in isolation from access control for the application the system aim to protect [8]. The implication of 
this finding is that IDS need to be supported by other security measures such as access control mechanism to 
enhance proactive detection.  The authors recognize this fact that even if IDS may use very good signature 
analysis mechanisms to detect intrusion or potential misuse, organizations must still ensure that they have strong 
user identification and authentication mechanism in place. 
Some Researchers have suggested the use of honeypots for intrusion detection instead of the traditional IDS. A 
honeypot, according to [9], is a decoy computer system that uses deception to lure intruders so as to learn their 
behaviors. Any interaction with a honeypot is likely an unauthorized or anomalous activity [10]. 
Typically, honeypot are deployed to detect new attacks and to address the challenges of false alarms. The logs 
from honeypots are normally used for researching hacking techniques, early intrusion detection, and incident 
response [11].  
Honeypot usefulness is dependent on the intruders’ interaction with it and this is a huge limitation. To address 
this limitation, honeypot are always carefully designed to attract and to contain intruders, and this most time 
requires the use of honeytoken to lead intruders to the honeypot. Honeytokens are like honeypot except that they 
are not computers but digital or information resource such as a word document; excel or spread sheet document, 
passwords, or database records [10]. 
3. Methodology 
The proposed integrated approach consists of multiple intrusion detection components made up of a trio of 
detectors, comprising of honeytoken, snort IDS, and a honeypot. These detectors were made to interact in a 
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complementary and mutually supportive fashion on the one hand, and on the other hand, they were made to 
interoperate effectively with an access control and authentication mechanism.  
3.1 Conceptual Description of the Trio Model 
The model consists of three phases, namely prevention, detection, and deterrence phases. Based on this trio of 
phases (PREvention, Detection and DETerence), the model is called the PREDDET model.  
The prevention phase is the top layer of the model and is concerned with the prevention of insider attacks such 
as unauthorized access, data modification, and privilege escalation. This phase is the first line of defence of the 
model. Prevention is enforced through access control and authentication processes. A user must be authenticated 
before access can be granted. 
On authentication, a role-based access control (rbac) mechanism is implemented. The rbac grants users access to 
the database based on roles authorized for each group of users. After the users are identified in the 
authentication module, the tasks permitted for the class of the users are displayed. So when a user is added to the 
system, the user is assigned roles based on his classification. The classification is determined by the job title of 
the user. The model also enforces a constraint, known as separation of duties. Separation of duties requires that 
no one individual should be able to process a transaction from initiation to completion [12]. This constrain 
makes it mandatory for a user to obtain authorization from the network administrator for any modification 
process. An unsuccessful authentication activates a token to display for use by the user. The use of this token 
and/or attempt to escalate privileges (such as a user attempting to authorize himself) triggers the detection phase 
of the model.  
The detection phase is the middle layer of the model and handles detection using multiple intrusion detection 
components coordinated by the control system. When the control system of the middle layer is triggered, it 
activates the honeypot which then presents the intruder with a decoy (‘fake’) database from the database server. 
At this time, the IDS and the honeypot start monitoring the activities of the intruder, logging them to the audit 
log file. By this approach, the honeypot diverts the attention of the intruder from the real database and provides 
containment for him. Intrusion detection alert is also generated and sent to the administrator. 
The logs from the IDS and honeypot are passed to the Forensic Analysis Tool (FAT) for analysis. This is the 
third phase and bottom layer of the model and is intended to establish the culpability of the offender as a 
deterrent to others in the system. The outcome of the forensic analysis is documented for necessary action by the 
network administrator. The following Figure 1 shows the conceptual view of the model. 
3.2 System Implementation 
The components specified in the trio model were assembled. These are an open source IDS called Snort; a 
virtual honeypot called v-honey and a honeytoken. The v-honey was designed with MySQL database and an 
interface for uploading approved students’ examination results. 
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An object oriented design approach was explored for the design of the application that provided the platform for 
the three components to function in a mutually supportive manner. This application also had a feature to support 
and enforce an authentication procedure and access control.  This application was implemented with Java, PHP 
and JavaScript languages.  
 
 
Fig.1. Conceptual view of the proposed model 
These application and the components it supports were deployed on an ad-hock wireless network. The network 
consists of six computers connected wirelessly by means of Access Point (AP). Snort and the v-honey were 
installed in the same system. The database server (Tomcat server) was set up at port 8080, where both snort and 
v-honey were set to monitor. Attack scenarios relating to data alterations and privilege escalation were then 
experimented using this environment. 
The network users used to test these attack scenarios were classified using a classification tree. Access rights 
were assigned to these users according to designated roles and a privilege table was designed and used to record 
access privileges of these users as shown in table 1.  
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Table 1: Privilege Table 
 
 
 
 
Where  
C (Create) – allows the creation or renaming of network object (such as database server) 
D (Delete) – enables the deletion of a network object 
R (Read) – allows user to read the content of an object value 
W (Write) – allows user to write or modify the content of an object state 
- implies that the privilege is not granted 
The above privilege table shows examOfficers and levelAdvisers are assigned access to all the privileges for the 
resultfile-object and is represented as resultfile-object.type = {C,D,R,W} while the HOD object type is 
represented as resultfile-object.type = {-,D,R,W} which assigns him all privileges except create. 
Similarly, information assets were classified using a decision tree and this was to enable us to determine the 
security level for each of the information items. Access rights were implemented based on role-based access 
control (rbac) model and Mysql database was used to store users’ credentials needed for authentication and their 
access rights. 
A user is authenticated by three set of credentials namely, username, password and a system MAC (Media 
Access Control) address. The system MAC addresses of every user were pre-registered and are automatically 
authenticated during a user login operation. The authentication module interoperates with the access control 
module. On user authentication, access is granted based on user roles. This module operates on the privilege 
table shown in table1 above.  
The authentication module also interoperates with Snort and v-honey by means of honey-tokens. At the entry 
point of the authentication module, honey-tokens in the form of login tokens were implanted. The use of the 
honeytoken triggers Snort IDS and v-honey to start logging the user activities on the network. It also triggers the 
generation of an SMS alerts that notifies the network administrator of an ongoing attack. The alert is sent to the 
mobile phone of the network administrator. 
3.3 System Testing 
Role Permission 
Set 
Access Control 
List (ACL) 
ExamOfficer/ 
levelAdviser 
[C,D,R,W] Resultfile-object 
HOD [-,D,R,W] Resultfile-object 
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The specific attack scenarios simulated were data modification and impersonation attack scenario on students’ 
examination results.  
The attack scenario involves an exam officer attempting to bypass the Head of Department (HOD) to modify the 
examination grades of a student using the HOD web address to access the result database server. The officer 
login with his credentials to gain access to the network application, then he initiated the modification process 
without seeking approval from the HOD. Ordinarily, the department enforces the principle of segregation of 
duties. This implies that the HOD must authorize any modification to all approved results.  
To authorize modification, the authentication module randomly generates a code for the HOD to authorize the 
completion of any modification. The exam officer tried to forge a code but the system could not match it with 
the HOD credentials. The system then grants him access to the v-honey honeypot instead of the real database 
server. The v-honey and Snort started logging his activities. The logs from v-honey and Snort were later 
collected and forensically analyzed with wireshark.  
3.4 Results and Discussion 
The authentication and access control processes introduced in the intrusion detection system makes the system 
proactive to intrusions. The authentication module in the front end of the system was effective due to the honey-
tokens implanted into it. Any unusual interaction with this module or attempt to bypass it triggers an SMS alert 
and the other detection components. The network administrator got the SMS alert in his mobile phone while the 
intrusion was ongoing. The alert shows the IP address of the intruder and the system successfully redirected the 
user to the v-honey 
The access control system enabled the intrusion detection components to be aware of the responsibilities of 
network users. The exam officer who attempted to bypass the HOD was detected since the system was able to 
tag responsibilities to every class of users. A breach of the segregation of duties principle implemented in the 
authentication module triggered the detection components and the misfeasor was redirected to the virtual 
honeypot (i.e. v-honey).  
The data from the IDS and the v-honey provided more data for wider spectrum comparison and forensic 
analysis. 
3.5 Forensic Analysis 
A forensic (post-mortem) analysis was conducted on snort captured packets using a network packet analyzer 
called Wireshark. The statistical menu of the Wireshark was used to generate the graphs. For all the I/O graphs, 
a tick interval of 10secs and 10 pixels per tick on the x axis were used while on the y axis, the packets/tick and 
an auto scale were used. 
The [13] procedures for digital forensic analysis were adopted. The snort log files derived from the experiments 
were recovered and copied into the system where Wireshark was installed. A list of search keywords in the log 
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file was created and include the following - http, login, modify/modification, MAC address, IP address, Admin, 
and Password. 
The recovered snort log files (1377869961 and 1377869399) were merged using the Wireshark merge menu. 
The merged file, merged961-399, was used as a sample for the analysis. The opened file was set to display only 
packets captured by http since we were interested in the user event with the web browser.  
The merged961-399 log file was examined, focusing on the revelant artifacts that would support or contradict 
our expectation. A conversation flow graph was generated from the http filtered displayed log file to establish 
all the computers involved in conversation with the server. The information in the comment column of the graph 
were examined for login, modify, modification, admin, and password and we found in the graph modification 
keyword initiated by 192.168.1.104. Then a tracing of all the conversations of this IP was conducted and 
discovered that at time 14.38 a modification of csc104 was made by this IP (192.168.1.104). It also approved the 
same result at time 14.39. The following Figure 2 and Figure 3 show the conversation flow graph. 
 
Fig.2. Evidence of modification 
 
The circled part in Figure 2 above shows the data modification initiated and performed by IP 192.168.1.104 
between time 14.38 and 14.39 he modified csc104 
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Fig.3. Modification and approval by IP 192.168.1.104 
In the above figure 3, the circled part shows when (between time 14.48.20 and 14.48.36) the system with IP 
192.168.1.104 login and modify csc105 without HOD’s input. 
Next, an Input and Output graph was plotted to trace the http captured packets in time of day in order to locate 
the packet frame as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Fig.4. IO Graph showing captured packets 
We located time 14.37 and 14.39 on the time axis respectively and clicked on the red graph at the specified 
position while looking at the packet-header detail window below the graph. A click on the spike of time 14.38 
displayed frame 588 and 14.39 displayed 599 in the packet-header detail window of wireshark. We noted that in 
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frame 599, the source IP 192.168.1.104 posted the modified csc104 result to the server as shown in the the 
portion circled in Figure 5. 
 
Fig.5. Packets visualized in I/O graph 
The packet-header detail window was expanded to locate the MAC address of both the source (listed as 
f8:d1:11:be:c9:a9) and destination (listed as 74:de:2b:f7:a1:b6) computers as shown in the circled part in Figure 
6. 
 
Fig.6. Investigated Mac addresses 
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Ethernet II, Src: Tp-LinkT_be:c9:a9 (f8:d1:11:be:c9:a9), Dst: LiteonTe_f7:a1:b6 (74:de:2b:f7:a1:b6) 
The v-honey log file was also examined for the mac addresses displayed in snort log file under examination. 
Figure 7 below shows the v-honey data logged simultaneously with snort on the network. The part circled shows 
the mac address and user event for the mac address 
 
Fig.7. Logs from v-honey 
  A comparison of the captured IP and MAC addresses with those in the configuration table maintained by the 
network administrator shows that the exam officer was the owner of the system used for the modification.  It 
was also observed that the system with IP 192.168.1.104 and mac address f8:d1:11:be:c9:a9 did a modification 
of csc104 and csc105 which he by himself approved. This confirmed the expectation that the web server was 
compromised for unauthorized modification and privilege escalation. 
3.6 Advantages of the Proposed Model 
The model is a generic model that can be applied in different environments. It requires the identification and 
classification of the assets in any given environment and the model can then be applied to enforce security.   
The following are specific features of the model: 
• Uninterrupted Transaction: The main thrust of this model is the protection of information without 
interrupting transactions in the database. In most existing systems, every query execution is intercepted for hash 
value computation during audit logging. This frequent interruption impacts on the performance of the system. 
This model achieves this performance by hiding the real database and then providing a ‘fake’ database for the 
attacker to tamper. This approach distracts the intruder’s attention from the real database, thinking the one being 
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modified was the real one. 
• Prompt Alert Notification: Notification of intrusion alerts and authorization request and responses are 
routed through real time communication system. This ensures prompt reception of alerts and messages to detect 
on-going intrusion and events. This approach provides a framework that frees the network administrator from 
being constantly glued to their systems. 
• Integrated Protection: The combined use of access control and multiple detectors ensure a robust 
protection of the database. 
• Intruder Trace Back: The model provides strategies for tracing an intruder after intrusion is detected. 
When offenders are aware of the possibility of being caught, then the fear of the penalty as stipulated in the 
organization’s security policy regarding unethical activities will deter potential offenders 
• Early Detection: Intrusive activities are detected early in the first phase of the model. Intrusion is 
triggered at the top layer of the model at an early stage before any tampering is done to the database 
• Containment: The ‘fake’ or decoy database protects the real database while presenting a fake database 
as containment for the intruder. 
• Multiple Data Source for Forensic Analysis: It provides for data collection from multiple sources 
rather than a single source. The data from the IDS and the honeypot provide more data for wider spectrum 
analysis and comparison during forensic analysis. 
• Knowledge of user Responsibilities: The role-based access control and the authentication part of the 
model highlight the responsibilities of the users.  This feature is useful in detecting users who attempt to escalate 
their privileges. The incidences of false alarms are also minimized because the system is able to tag 
responsibilities to every class of users. 
3.7 Constraints of the study: Testing the system on campus intranet was a challenge as academic 
institutions around us had no functional intranets. Thus setting up an ad hoc network became an option for 
testing. This constraint notwithstanding, we expect similar performance when deployed on a functional intranet. 
4. Conclusion 
Information, being one of the most valuable assets of any organization, has always been protected from 
unauthorized access. The approaches for providing such protection vary among organizations. Some of these 
measures include firewall, antivirus software, and Intrusion Detection System (IDS). In spite of these arrays of 
measures, there is no single approach that can guarantee protection against insider’s intrusion attacks. Therefore, 
this proposed integrated approach provides for a fresh paradigm shift in the conception and design of robust 
intrusion detection systems. This study has provided an integrated detection components approach to addressing 
the issue of network intrusion detection and prevention strategies. Also, ability to generate evidences for post 
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intruder activities by means of forensic analysis provides a reliable means for tracing an intruder after intrusion 
is detected. When offenders are aware of the possibility of being caught in an offence, then the fear of the 
penalty as stipulated in the organization’s security policy regarding unethical activities tend to deter them from 
engaging in such act. The results of all these are the emergence of an intrusion prevention, detection and 
deterrence system that moderates the activities of network insider’s activities.   
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